General Sherman	General Johnston
Result(s): Inconclusive
Location: Gordon County and Whitfield County
Campaign: Atlanta Campaign (1864)
Date(s): May 13-15, 1864
Principal Commanders: Major General William T. Sherman USA; General Joseph E. Johnston CSA;
Forces Engaged: Military Division of the Mississippi USA; Army of Tennessee CSA
Estimated Casualties: 5,547 total (US 2,747; CS 2,800)

May Union Casualty Totals

May Confederate Casualty Totals

The Battle of Resaca The battle of Resaca in May 1864 represents a series of firsts: the first major battle of the Adanta Campaign, the first occasion in Georgia in 1864 of Confederate and Federal armies in their entirety facing one another across a field of batde, and the first major encounter between Joseph E. Johnston and William T. Sherman as army field commanders. The two-day battle of Resaca proved to be an experience for Sherman that would cause him to alter the patterns of strategy and tactics in the campaign that followed. Disappointed by McPherson's lack of aggressiveness on two occasions, and Hooker's bungled attack on Hood's corps on May 15, Sherman abandoned General Grant's injunction to "go after Johnston's army and break it up." Instead, he reversed the original sequence of the plan by turning to the strategy of maneuver. Rather than risk a decisive batde with Johnston's army, Sherman would gain the capture of Atlanta by flanking movements drawing on his advantage in numbers. Thus, after Resaca, Sherman switched from the hunt for a decisive military showdown to the focus on what amounted to essentially political objectives. The frustrating Resaca experience reawakened his natural sense of caution. He found the strategy of maneuver more suitable to his nature and to the nature of the Mid-western army he commanded. The practical result of this switch in strategy would be Atlanta's capture in September-the timing of Atlanta's fall would have a profound political impact on the reelection of an American president and subsequent the outcome of the war. It was Spring, 1864, as the two northern armies in Georgia, the other in Virginia, embarked on what would be thefinal act in the mighty struggle to preserve the Union. The key to the campaign to capture Atlanta was transportation. Without the railroad connecting Chattanooga with Atlanta, Sherman's army could not have been adequately supplied. The Atlanta in a daily practical sense became a contest for control of the Western and Atlantic Railroad. In Sherman's words: Atlanta Campaign of 1864 would have been impossible without this road, that all our battles were fought for its possession, and that the Western and Atlantic Railroad of Georgia should be the pride of every true American because by reason of its existence the Union was saved. Every foot of it should be sacred ground, because it was moistened by patriotic blood, and that over a hundred miles of it was fought a continuous battle of 120 days, during which, day and night, were heard the continuous boom of cannon and the sharp crack of the rifle. Resaca was to be the first important contest for that railroad. The key to the plan, of course, was to force the battle near Chattanooga, where great stockpiles of Federal supplies lay immediately available and secure behind Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Sherman knew that Johnston would seek to weaken his army by drawing the Union armies deep into the interior where a crippling blow might be struck-every mile nearer Atlanta would increase Sherman's vulnerability. Some weeks before, General George H. Thomas, who commanded the Army of the Cumberland, alerted Sherman to the opportunities offered by Snake Creek Gap as a route by which the railroad could be reached at Resaca and Johnston's position turned. Thomas had offered to lead his Cumberland soldiers through this defile while the armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee occupied Johnston's attention at Dalton. Sherman saw the merit in the plan, but because he distrusted Thomas' ability to move his large army rapidly through the gorge, and because of unexpected transportation, delays to the Army of the Tennessee units of which were en route from Mississippi, he decided to modify the plan to reverse the roles of the Cumberland and Tennessee armies. James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was to strike quickly near Resaca-his movements screened by the high ridges west of Dalton, while the Army of the Cumberland was to remain near Dalton and engage in diversionary tactics. If the plan was to succeed in bringing the Confederates to bay on favorable terrain, McPherson must entrench across the railroad somewhere north of Calhoun. The events of the next few days would serve to remind the northern commander of his own deficiencies, and of the limitations of key subordinates. Cumulatively, their mistakes would produce a parade of missed opportunities that would force William Tecumseh Sherman to revise his plan for the months ahead. It would be a long road to Atlanta. My Source:  The Battle of Resaca by Philip L. Secrist May 14th Both armies were in place, the Federal's north and west of Resaca, their flanks resting at or near the Oostanuala and Conasauga rivers. The Confederate army (many of whom had marched the 13 miles from Dalton during the night) was anchored with its flanks and rear to the same rivers, embracing the village and the railroad bridge within its perimeter, but with its rear and flanks against the river there was no place to run should there be a Federal breakthrough. On 14 and 15 May the battle of Resaca became the first major struggle of the Atlanta campaign. The heaviest action on the 14th was along the Camp Creek valley west of the village. Here late in the day, elements of McPherson's XV army corps rushed across the creek capturing a forward line of low hills occupied by Cantey's undermanned brigade of Polk's corps, giving the Federals an excellent artillery position from which they could harass the Confederate railroad and foot bridges. Despite repeated attempts, lasting until nearly 10:00 P.M., Polk's efforts to regain these hills were unsuccessful. The Federals now had a key position from which they could interdict the Confederate bridge crossings on the Oostanaula. Earlier that day, supported by a brigade of the XIV Corps, two divisions of the Army of the Ohio failed in their attack on Hardee and Hood near the head of Camp Creek a mile of so north of McPherson's action. Further east along Hood's line, the Confederate division of Brigadier General Carter Stevenson succeeded for a time in driving elements of the IV Corps from the direct wagon road to Resaca but were turned back by the heroics of the 5th Indiana Artillery led by Captain Peter Simonson, the timely arrival of Federal reinforcements, and the coming of darkness. So closed the significant action on 14 May. May 15th The battle resumed along Hood's line north of the village. Hooker's XX army corps prepared an attack designed to drive Hood's corps toward the Oostanuala. Poorly managed, Hooker's brigades ran directly into an oncoming Confederate attack equally bungled. Stopped in his tracks by this collision with opposing forces, Hooker did manage to capture a four-gun Confederate battery run too far in advance of infantry by the direct orders of General Hood. Meanwhile, south of the Oostanaula River, General W. H. T. Walker's division, close to the town of Calhoun, guarding the flank and rear of the Confederate army along the river, had become the victim of a successful river crossing by elements of McPherson's XVI army corps at Lay's Ferry on 14 May. Walker notified Johnston of this threat to the line of retreat, but later sent a second message telling of the Federal withdrawal back across the river near dark. Early on the morning of the 15th the Federal river crossing was repeated, this time with a full division and the construction of a "tete-de-pont" (entrenched beachhead) on the Calhoun side of the Oostanaula River. The Confederate railroad supply line was less than 3 miles away. The Federals were now too strongly entrenched to be attacked. Walker's division was in trouble, and by extension, Joe Johnston's Confederate army. No alternative remained but to retreat. The Confederates Escape The Trap The Confederate withdrawal from Resaca the night of 15 May was flawless. Hardee's plan of retreat is an example. He instructed that all supply wagons, ambulances, and artillery were to cross on the pontoon bridge, all foot troops (except the skirmishers covering the retreat) were to cross on the railroad trestle bridge (now floored) beginning at 10:00 P.M.-in a Cleburne, Cheatham, and Bate sequence, with thirty-minute departure intervals between each division. Since Walker's division of Hardee's corps was already south of the river near Calhoun guarding the ferry crossings, he was not involved in the river crossing. After crossing the river each division was to take up their "ordnance train, ambulances, and artillery:'lO Hood's and Polk's corps extracted themselves from the battlefield during the night equally efficiently. By 5:00 A.M. the field of battle at Resaca was completely abandoned by the Confederates. As for the Federals, the chase was on. My Source:  Sherman's 1864 Trail of Battle to Atlanta by Philip L. Secrist