June 27, 1864

	Union	Military Division of the Mississippi	3,000
	Confederate	Army of Tennessee	1,000
	Total Losses		4,000

Battle Location:  Cobb County
Campaign:  Atlanta Campaign (1864)
Theatre:  Main Western
Winner:  Confederacy
Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman		Gen. Joseph Eggleston Johnston
Union Commander		Confederate Commander
The largest engagement fought north of the Chattahoochee River during Union major general William Tecumseh Sherman"s campaign for Atlanta in 1864, the battle of Kennesaw Mountain proved to be a tactical success for Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston. The victory was shortlived, however, as Sherman sidestepped the impenetrable Confederate position and continued his advance toward the third largest city in Georgia. Beginning on the first week of May 1864, Sherman and his three armies totaling nearly 100,000 men began moving south along the line of the Western & Atlantic Railroad toward Atlanta. Johnston"s 60,000 troops from the Army of Tennessee and the Army of Mississippi tried to block the Federal advance by entrenching across its path and inviting an assault against their prepared defenses. For a month the two forces gradually moved deeper into Georgia as they battled each other, yet Sherman refused to totally commit his troops to an attack. Choosing instead to use his superior numbers to turn Johnston out of his well-constructed defenses, the campaign became one of maneuver as Sherman moved to get behind Johnston and the latter shifted to block him. On the evening of 18 June, Johnston"s troops began moving into newly constructed defensive works along the slopes of a ridgeline anchored by Kennesaw Mountain, just west of Marietta, having withdrawn from their previous positions at Pine Mountain, Lost Mountain, and Mud Creek. Rising to a height of 691 feet, the position was as indomitable as any the Confederates had held since the onset of Sherman"s campaign. Choosing at first to avoid attacking Johnston head-on, Sherman continued his pattern of flanking movements and sent Major General John M. Schofield"s Army of the Ohio and Joseph Hooker"s XX Corps to maneuver around the Confederate left flank then eastward to the rail line, cutting off Johnston"s line of retreat. Detecting this Federal movement, Johnston responded by swinging Lieutenant General John Bell Hood"s corps from the Confederate right flank to the threatened left. There, near a farm owned by Peter Valentine Kolb, Hood massed his troops for an attack. Having inadequately reconnoitered the area, Hood assumed that Federal troops were in a column marching eastward up the Powder Springs Road. In fact, Hooker, knowing of Hood"s presence, ordered his 14,000 men and forty cannons to prepare barricades and move into a line of battle. On 22 June, the misguided Hood ordered his 11,000 men to attack. As the Confederates advanced to within 500 yards of the Federal line, Hooker"s batteries opened up a lethal barrage of solid shot and canister. Infantry volleys finished the task, driving Hood"s men from the field. The battle at Kolb"s farm cost Hood 1,500 men; Hooker lost 250. Johnston was furious with Hood for the unauthorized and impetuous attack. Although he continued to hold strong defensive ground, the past month"s fighting had whittled Johnston"s force down to 43,000 men. The last thing that he needed was a renegade subordinate. For Sherman, the time seemed right to change his tactics. Believing Johnston"s eight-mile line was stretched too thin, the Federal general ordered Schofield to feign an attack against the Confederate left flank while Major General James B. McPherson"s Army of the Tennessee did the same against Johnston"s right. McPherson was to follow up his successful feint with an attack against the Confederate line south and west of Kennesaw Mountain. Assuming his adversary would be forced to send reinforcements to both apparently endangered flanks, Sherman could then throw the Army of the Cumberland, under the command of Major General George H. Thomas, at the center of the Confederate line and penetrate on through. Sherman hoped to breach Johnston"s line at two points, establish a "secure lodgement beyond...[and advance] toward Marietta and the railroad in case of success." The Federal attack began as planned at 8:00 in the morning on 27 June—an artillery barrage aimed at Kennesaw Mountain signaled the assault. Soon, Sherman"s plans began to go awry. The feints against the Confederate flanks did not achieve their desired effect. McPherson"s main assault with 5,500 troops against Pigeon Hill, on the ridgeline south of Kennesaw Mountain, achieved initial success in driving in Confederate skirmishers, but McPherson"s men were soon met and pinned down by deadly fire from Major General Samuel G. French"s well- entrenched division. After two hours the attackers withdrew. The largest assault against the Confederate line occurred two miles south of Pigeon Hill at a point defended by two divisions under Major Generals Patrick R. Cleburne and Benjamin Franklin Cheatham. Arranged in five columns, the 8,000 Federals were ordered to remove the percussion caps from their rifles and advance on the run using only fixed bayonets. Speed was the essence of this attack—no one was to pause to fire a shot until the Confederate line was broken. Beginning at 9:00, the assault soon degenerated into confusion as men in the rear caught up with those in the vanguard, who had been halted by concentrated fire from the Confederate earthworks to their front. The fighting was particularly ferocious at a salient in Cheatham"s line later called the "Dead Angel." There Federal soldiers advanced to within fifteen yards of the Confederate line before falling. By noon, Thomas"s men could take no more and withdrew. The battle had proved to be a disaster for Sherman. Federal casualties for the day totaled 3,000; Confederate losses were 552. Sherman"s army remained in front of Kennesaw Mountain for four more days, burying their dead and recovering from the exhausting battle. When word arrived at the commanding general"s headquarters that Schofield"s feint had successfully placed the Army of the Ohio in a position to threaten the Confederate rear, Sherman decided to return to his strategy of maneuver, flanking Johnston to the west and racing for the Chattahoochee River and Atlanta. On 2 July, the Confederate commander had no choice but to withdraw from his Kennesaw line and move south, hoping once again to entice Sherman into battle on ground favorable to the defense.
My Source:  Encyclopedia of the American Civil War — Alan C. Downs