

April 6, 1862 To April 7, 1862



	Forces	Losses
Union	N/A	13,047
Confederacy	N/A	10,694
Total	N/A	23,741

Battle Location: Hardin County Tennessee

Campaign:

Theatre:

Winner: Union



Maj. Gen. Ulysses Simpson Grant
Union Commander


Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston	Gen. Pierre Gustave Beauregard
Confederate Commanders

Battle Writeup 1

The First Day April 6, 1862 With the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson in February, General Johnston withdrew his disheartened Confederate forces into west Tennessee, northern Mississippi and Alabama to reorganize. In early March, General Halleck responded by ordering General Grant to advance his Union Army of West Tennessee on an invasion up the Tennessee River.

Occupying Pittsburg Landing, Grant entertained no thought of a Confederate attack. Halleck's instructions were that following the arrival of General Buell's Army of the Ohio from Nashville, Grant would advance south in a joint offensive to seize the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, the Confederacy's only east-west all weather supply route that linked the lower Mississippi Valley to cities on the Confederacy's east coast.

Assisted by his second-in-command, General Beauregard, Johnston shifted his scattered forces and concentrated almost 55,000 men around Corinth. Strategically located where the Memphis & Charleston crossed the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, Corinth was the western Confederacy's most important rail junction. On April 3, realizing Buell would soon reinforce Grant, Johnston launched an offensive with his newly christened Army of the Mississippi. Advancing upon Pittsburg Landing with 43,938 men, Johnston planned to surprise Grant, cut his army off from retreat to the Tennessee River, and drive the Federals west into the swamps of Owl Creek.

In the gray light of dawn, April 6, a small Federal reconnaissance discovered Johnston's army deployed for battle astride the Corinth road, just a mile beyond the forward Federal camps. Storming forward, the Confederates found the Federal position unfortified. Johnston had achieved almost total surprise. By mid-morning, the Confederates seemed within easy reach of victory, overrunning one frontline Union division and capturing its camp. However, stiff resistance on the Federal right entangled Johnston's brigades in a savage fight around Shiloh Church. Throughout the day, Johnston's army hammered the Federal right, which gave ground but did not break. Casualties upon this brutal killing ground were immense.

Meanwhile, Johnston's flanking attack stalled in front of Sarah Bell's peach orchard and the dense oak thicket labeled the "hornet's nest" by the Confederates. Grant's left flank withstood Confederate assaults for seven crucial hours before being forced to yield ground in the late afternoon. Despite inflicting heavy casualties and seizing ground, the Confederates only drove Grant towards the river, instead of away from it. The Federal survivors established a solid front before Pittsburg Landing and repulsed the last Confederate charge as dusk ended the first day of fighting.

The Second Day April 7, 1862

Shiloh's first day of slaughter also witnessed the death of the Confederate leader, General Johnston, who fell at mid-afternoon, struck down by a stray bullet while directing the action on the Confederate right. At dusk, the advance division of General Buell's Federal Army of the Ohio reached Pittsburg Landing, and crossed the river to file into line on the Union left during the night. Buell's arrival, plus the timely appearance of a reserve division from Grant's army, led by Major General Lewis Wallace, fed over 22,500 reinforcements into the Union lines. On April 7, Grant renewed the fighting with an aggressive counterattack.

Taken by surprise, General Beauregard managed to rally 30,000 of his badly disorganized Confederates, and mounted a tenacious defense. Inflicting heavy casualties on the Federals, Beauregard's troops temporarily halted the determined Union advance. However, strength in numbers provided Grant with a decisive advantage. By midafternoon, as waves of fresh Federal troops swept forward, pressing the exhausted Confederates back to Shiloh Church, Beauregard realized his armies' peril and ordered a retreat. During the night, the Confederates withdrew, greatly disorganized, to their fortified stronghold at Corinth. Possession of the grisly battlefield passed to the victorious Federal's, who were satisfied to simply reclaim Grant's camps and make an exhausted bivouac among the dead.

General Johnston's massive and rapid concentration at Corinth, and surprise attack on Grant at Pittsburg Landing, had presented the Confederacy with an opportunity to reverse the course of the war. The aftermath, however, left the invading Union forces still poised to carry out the capture of the Corinth rail junction. Shiloh's awesome toll of 23,746 men killed, wounded, or missing brought a shocking realization to both sides that the war would not end quickly.

My Source: Civil War Home

Their Source: "The Atlas of the Civil War" by James M. McPherson

Battle Writeup 2

As a result of the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, Confederate Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, the commander in the area, was forced to fall back, giving up Kentucky and much of West and Middle Tennessee. He chose Corinth, Mississippi, a major transportation center, as the staging area for an offensive against Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and his Army of the Tennessee before the Army of the Ohio, under Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, could join it.

The Confederate retrenchment was a surprise, although a pleasant one, to the Union forces, and it took Grant, with about 40,000 men, some time to mount a southern offensive, along the Tennessee River, toward Pittsburg Landing. Grant received orders to await Buell’s Army of the Ohio at Pittsburg Landing. Grant did not choose to fortify his position; rather, he set about drilling his men many of which were raw recruits. Johnston originally planned to attack Grant on April 4, but delays postponed it until the 6th. Attacking the Union troops on the morning of the 6th, the Confederates surprised them, routing many. Some Federals made determined stands and by afternoon, they had established a battle line at the sunken road, known as the “Hornets Nest.” Repeated Rebel attacks failed to carry the Hornets Nest, but massed artillery helped to turn the tide as Confederates surrounded the Union troops and captured, killed, or wounded most.

Johnston had been mortally wounded earlier and his second in command, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, took over. The Union troops established another line covering Pittsburg Landing, anchored with artillery and augmented by Buell’s men who began to arrive and take up positions. Fighting continued until after dark, but the Federals held. By the next morning, the combined Federal forces numbered about 40,000, outnumbering Beauregard’s army of less than 30,000. Beauregard was unaware of the arrival of Buell’s army and launched a counterattack in response to a two-mile advance by William Nelson’s division of Buell’s army at 6:00 am, which was, at first, successful. Union troops stiffened and began forcing the Confederates back. Beauregard ordered a counterattack, which stopped the Union advance but did not break its battle line. At this point, Beauregard realized that he could not win and, having suffered too many casualties, he retired from the field and headed back to Corinth. On the 8th, Grant sent Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman, with two brigades, and Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, with his division, in pursuit of Beauregard. They ran into the Rebel rearguard, commanded by Col. Nathan Bedford Forrest, at Fallen Timbers. Forrest’s aggressive tactics, although eventually contained, influenced the Union troops to return to Pittsburg Landing. Grant’s mastery of the Confederate forces continued; he had beaten them once again. The Confederates continued to fall back until launching their mid-August offensive.

My Source: National Park Service

Battle Writeup 3

The Confederate Army of Mississippi (almost 45,000) attacked two separate Union Armies (Tennessee and Ohio) that totaled over 65,000.

Losses were very heavy, over 13,000 Union and 10,000 Confederate.

As a result of the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, Albert Sidney Johnston, the regional commander, was forced to fall back, giving up Kentucky and much of West and Middle Tennessee. He chose Corinth, Mississippi, a major transportation center, as the staging area for an offensive against Grant’s Army of the Tennessee before Buell’s Army of the Ohio could join it. (Part of Johnston’s choice was necessity: with the Union controlling the Tennessee River, he could only mass on one side or the other, he couldn’t shift back and forth.) Johnston pulled his own men out of central Kentucky, and joined Polk’s and Beauregard’s men from western Tennessee with Bragg’s men from Pensacola, Florida.

Johnston’s withdrawal from central Tennessee was a surprise, although a pleasant one, to the Union forces, and it took Grant, with about 40,000 men, some time to mount a southern offensive. He envisioned operating chasing the Confederate armies, realizing that if he defeated the rebel armies, cities would fall later. However, his theater commander, Henry Halleck, thought more in terms of geographical objectives. Their confusion delayed the operation along the Tennessee River. It did mean that Buell’s army (around 50,000) were ordered west, to join Grant’s troops.

Grant’s army was camped (unfortified) at Pittsburg Landing, only 22 miles by road from Corinth. He didn’t have protective detachments out, nor did he have cavalry to screen his position. (He did know the Confederates were massing a force larger than his. Since many of his men were green, most of his energy was directed to drilling them. They were scattered by divisions (some division commanders separated their brigades) through the partly wooded ground. The whole area was sparsely settled, with patches of heavy woods and cleared fields up to 80 acres. There were also a number of creeks and roads splitting the ground into bits and pieces.

Johnston originally planned to move on April 1, but his concentration was slow and it took time to build one army out of four. He was delayed two days and he was tempted to wait longer for Earl Van Dorn to bring 20,000 more men from Arkansas. (Van Dorn was delayed by high water; if Johnston had waited for him to arrive, Grant and Buell would have united as well.) Even that was not the end of the delays in a green army, and having only two roads to march on. They were 9 hours late arriving, 4 PM instead of 7 AM, and had to postpone the attack until the April 6th since there wasn’t enough daylight left on the 5th. There were signs of the impending attack, but the Northern forces ignored them all. Grant telegraphed “I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place.”

Johnston organized his roughly 45,000-man attack in three lines, Hardee’s Corps leading, Bragg’s in the middle, and Polk’s small Corps (with Breckenridge’s division) as the third line. (This had the problem that nobody had their own troops to call forward as a reserve.) At 6 AM the gray line started forward, but got tangled in the woods, so the first and second lines merged and reduced Johnston’s reserve to just the third line. The advance hit the gap between Prentiss’ and Sherman’s divisions and broke through. As early as 7.30 Johnston threw in his third line, Polk to support the left and Breckinridge to the right. Union reinforcements were thrown in, McClernand’s and Hurlbut’s divisions, but at the same time Prentiss’ division collapsed. From his whole division Prentiss rallied about a regiment-worth of men. But he rallied them in a strong position, a battle line at the sunken road later known as the “Hornets Nest.” Badly co-ordinated Confederate attacks one after another were repulsed. Johnston himself led one of the attacks, and was wounded. (He didn’t think it was serious, but he bled to death about 2.30 and Beauregard took command.)

Through the morning and early afternoon the Confederates pressed the Union flanks, using their numerical superiority over Grant’s single Army. Sometimes resistance was fierce, sometimes weak, but the flanks finally gave way, and about 3 PM Bragg led his men in a flank attack which crumpled Hurlbut’s line. Some of his men were cut off when Hardee linked with Bragg; after fierce fighting about 2,200 men finally surrendered.

The prospects for the Union were grim. Thousands of green soldiers had left the ranks individually, or whole units dissolved during withdrawals. They skulked back to the river, finding shelter under the overhanging banks from the risks of battle. But if the Confederates got to the top of the bluffs, the mob of men – hardly soldiers any longer – would have to surrender. Instead, Col. Joseph Webster built an artillery line, 40 to 50 guns, a bare half-mile from the river. Behind the thin line Hurlbut rallied about 4,000 men. Bragg tried to mount an attack, but the Southern forces were exhausted and scattered. Orders got confused and of two brigades available, only Chalmers’ attacked and was bloodily repulsed. It was too late in the day for another attack; Grant’s army had survived.

The night passed with the Confederates in old Union camps, units and men tangled and mixed. Meanwhile Buell’s men were arriving; a division had arrived late on the 6th (suffering only three casualties) and Grant was trying to reorganize his men. By daylight on the 7th the situation was reversed. Union forces outnumbered the Confederates; Johnston’s gamble on fighting the two armies separately had failed.

Grant and Buell had no combined plan, neither took charge (Grant was senior) but their numbers were far superior. Their fresh troops (Buell’s plus Lew Wallace’s division of Grant’s that had been separate from the main army) alone outnumbered the Confederates, and the Southern forces were exhausted and scattered. It was obvious that they could attack with every chance of success.

The Union advance started early, and contact was made about 5:20 AM. Beauregard at first counterattacked – he didn’t know that Buell’s men had arrived. The Union regained the initiative and Southern counterattacks could halt the advance, but never break the Union line. Gradually the Confederates were driven back, but it was not until early afternoon that Beauregard ordered a retreat. Breckinridge commanded a 4,000 man rearguard, with Forrest “between him and the enemy”; there was no pursuit, and the rearguard only pulled back about two miles. Even on the 8th, a Union advance by two divisions was tentative, and stopped when Forrest charged the 4th Illinois Cavalry at Fallen Timbers. The casualties were very heavy, about 13,000 Union losses and 10,000 Confederate. This was the bloodiest battle of the war so far, and caused Grant real problems with state politicians, who complained that he got their constituents killed.

Grant had beaten the Confederates once again. Further bad news was the surrender of Island No. 10 on the Mississippi on the 7th, with 7,000 prisoners and – more important – opening the Mississippi as far as Memphis. The Confederates continued to fall back until launching their mid-August offensive.

My Source: E-History